From the Co-operator’s Leadership Resource Collection

1421: The Year China Discovered the World
Gavin Menzies

Editor’s Note: This excerpt has been taken from pages 29 to 38 in 1421: The Year China Discovered the World.

Over 10 years ago I stumbled upon an incredible discovery, a clue hidden in an ancient map which, though it did not lead to buried treasure, suggested that the history of the world as it has been known and handed down for centuries would have to be radically revised.

I was pursuing an interest that had become a consuming passion for me: medieval history, and in particular the maps and charts of early explorers. I loved to examine these old charts, tracing contours, coastlines, the shifting shapes of shoals and sandbars, the menace of rocks and reefs. I followed the ebb and flow of tides, the pull of unseen currents and the track of prevailing winds, peeling back the layers of meaning contained within the charts.

The wintry plains of Minnesota started me on my research. It was not necessarily the first place you would think of to discover a document with such profound implications, but the James Ford Bell Library at the University of Minnesota has a remarkable collection of early maps and charts, and one in particular had attracted my attention. It had been in the collection of Sir Thomas Phillips, a wealthy British collector born in the late 18th century, but its existence had remained virtually unknown until the collection was rediscovered half a century ago.

The chart was dated 1424 and signed by a Venetian cartographer by the name of Zuane Pizzigano. It showed Europe and parts of Africa, and as I compared it with a modern map, I realized that the cartographer had drawn the coastlines of Europe accurately. It was an extraordinary cartographic achievement for that era, but not one of earth-shattering significance in itself. However, my eye was then drawn to the most curious feature of the map. The cartographer had also drawn a group of four islands far out in the western Atlantic. The names he gave them—Satanazes, Antilia, Saya and Ymana—did not correspond to any modern place-names and there are no large islands in the area where he had

The countries beyond the horizon and at the ends of the earth have all become subjects and to the most western of the western or the most northern of the northern countries however far away they may be.

-part of an inscription on a memorial stone erected by Admiral Zhang He at Ch’ang Lo on the banks of the Yangtze estuary in 1431

www.csl.uoguelph.ca
positioned them. That could have been a simple error in calculating longitude, for Europeans did not master that difficult art until well into the eighteenth century, but my first, troubling thought was that the islands were imaginary and had existed only in the mind of the man who drew the chart.

I looked again. The two biggest islands were painted in bold colours, Antilia in dark blue, Satanazes in pillar-box red. The rest of the chart was uncoloured, and it seemed certain that Pizzigano wished to emphasize that these were important, recently discovered islands. All the names marked on the chart appeared to be in medieval Portuguese. Antilia—anti “on the opposite side of” and ihla “island”—meant an island on the opposite side of the Atlantic to Portugal; other than that, there was nothing in the name to help me identify it. Satanazes, “Satan’s or Devil’s Island,” was a very distinctive name. A greater number of towns were marked on the largest island, Antilia, indicating that it was better known. Satanazes had only five names, and featured the enigmatic words con and ymana.

My interest was now thoroughly aroused. What were these islands? Did they really exist? The date of the map, its provenance and authenticity were unimpeachable, yet if it was genuine, it marked lands in places, where, according to the accepted history, no Europeans had ventured for another seven decades. After several months of examining charts and documents in maps rooms and archives, I became convinced that Antilia and Satanizes were actually the Caribbean islands of Puerto Rico and Guadeloupe. There were far too many points of similarity between them for it to be a coincidence, but that meant that somebody had accurately surveyed the islands some seventy years before Columbus reached the Caribbean. This seemed an incredible revelation—Columbus had not discovered the New World, yet his voyage had always been regarded as an absolutely defining moment. It marked the point when, led by the Portuguese, Europeans had begun to embark on the great voyages of discovery, the long, restless expansion over the face of the globe that was to characterize the next five hundred years.

I had seen the maps, dating from the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, that show parts of the world then unknown to European explorers. There are inaccuracies—some of the lands depicted are unrecognizable, or misshapen, or in locations where no land exists—and because the picture they offer of the world contradicts the accepted history of exploration they have long been dismissed as fables, forgeries or, at best, puzzling anomalies. But I found myself returning to those early maps and charts again and again, and as I studied them and evaluated them, a new picture of the medieval world began to emerge.

My research confirmed that several Chinese fleets had indeed made voyages of exploration in the early years of the fifteenth century. The last and greatest of them all—four fleets combining in one vast armada—set sail in early 1421. The last surviving ships returned to China in the summer and autumn of 1423. There was not extant record of where they had voyaged in the intervening years, but the maps showed that they had not merely rounded the Cape of Good Hope and traversed the Atlantic to chart the islands I had seen on the Pizzigano map of 1424, they had then gone on to explore Antarctica and the Arctic, North and South America, and had crossed the Pacific to Australia. They had solved the problems of calculating latitude and longitude and had mapped the earth and the heavens with equal accuracy.

---

1Excerpt taken from 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, 29-38.
From the Co-operator’s Leadership Resource Collection

*A Class With Drucker: The Lost Lessons of the World’s Greatest Management Teacher*  
William A. Cohen  
*New York et al.: American Management Association, 2008*

---

*Editor’s Note: This excerpt has been taken from pages xiii to xiv in* *A Class with Drucker.*

Peter Drucker was a true genius—an amazing individual who changed modern management forever. He wrote 39 books and numerous articles. There are thousands of references to him and his work, hundreds of articles about him, and several books, too. Why then this book? Although so much has been written about Drucker, his consulting work, and his philosophies, little has been written about how or what he taught in the classroom.

Peter Drucker was my professor in probably the first executive PhD program in management in academic history. I was his student from 1975 to 1979, and the first graduate of this program at Claremont Graduate School, which today is known as the Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito Graduate School of Management and is part of Claremont Graduate University. This was a program to which Peter committed his life from his first class in 1975. Our relationship continued through the years until shortly before his death.

To say that I learned much from Peter Drucker would be a gross understatement. What he taught literally changed my life. When I met him I was a young struggling ex-Air Force officer only recently involved in business management, with no academic experience at all. Beginning with my graduation from Claremont’s program, and following many of Peter’s lessons that are contained in this book, I was re-commissioned in the Air Force Reserve and rose to the rank of major general. I entered academia and eventually became a full professor and university president, even teaching several times at my alma mater as an adjunct professor. In fact, at one time when Peter was not teaching at Claremont in 1985, and I was, he allowed me to use his office. I became a book author and wrote books which were published in 18 languages. Peter was generous enough to call my books “scholarly.” For all this, though he would deny it, I credit Peter Drucker.

*A Class with Peter Drucker* contains my recollections of what

---

*Peter Drucker is gone, but his deeds, his achievements, accomplishments, and contributions live after him, and they are significant. As Peter himself said, when he first started writing about management, if you went into a bookstore and asked for books on the subject, you might find a few slim volumes if you were lucky. Today, you cannot go into even a medium-sized bookstore without finding an entire shelf filled with books on every aspect of management. This fact is largely due to Peter. He truly was the Father of Modern Management. (245)*

-Bill Cohen

---

it was like to be in a Drucker class as a Drucker student during this early period. I have used my notes, old papers, and other information to reconstruct some of his lectures and our conversations to give the reader the best picture possible of how things actually were. I have tried to come close to capturing his actual words, but in any case, I believe I achieved the spirit of what he said and how he said it. My aim is to put he, the reader, in the classroom as if he were there with me at the time hearing Drucker and participating in every interaction I had with him.

I debated whether to re-read Peter’s books before writing this book. I decided not to do so in order not to corrupt my perception of what he taught at the time. I occasionally referred to my well-worn copy of Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices to jog my memory about a particular lesson, as this was our only textbook when I was his student, and even this volume was not always helpful, since much of what Drucker taught in the classroom was not in his books, or had a somewhat different emphasis.

I didn’t want to stop with just what Peter taught, but what I did with his knowledge. Peter did not tell us how to do things. He frequently taught as he consulted, by asking questions. That showed us what to do and got us thinking how to do it ourselves. So, after explaining Peter’s lesson, I have tried to bridge this final gap by giving the reader my interpretation of what Peter meant and how I used and applied his teaching, and perhaps how the reader can as well.

The first chapter of the book tells much of my background at the time and how I came to be the first executive doctorate student of the “Father of Modern Management.” The second chapter sets the background of the Drucker classroom and explains how Peter taught. Chapters 3 through 19, cover a variety of Peter’s lessons, from “What Everyone Knows is Frequently Wrong” (Chapter 3) to “Drucker’s Principles of Development” (Chapter 19) and how to apply them.

Peter Drucker was a man not only of great ability and insight, but of great integrity. I have tried to be true to his story and my own as his student. At this point, Peter would have said, “Enough. If your book is worth anything, let’s get on with it.” I hope you agree that it is.

Bill Cohen—March 2007

Peter F. Drucker

Picture Source: http://www.cgu.edu/pages/3764.asp

2Excerpt taken from A Class with Drucker, xiii-xiv.
Editor’s Note: This excerpt has been taken from pages 1 to 3 in Reform and Leadership in the Public Sector. This book was graciously donated by Edwar Elgar Publishing Inc. for the CSL International Leadership conference in May of 2007.

Although it is customary to regard the long-run development of western public administration systems as characterized by two great reformist epochs — ‘Progressive-Era’ Public Administration (PPA) in the nineteenth century and ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) in the last quarter of the twentieth century — this conventional wisdom disguises significant differences not only in the nature of the reform process in different developed countries, but also in the progression of reform measures (Hood 1994). The evolution of public sector institutions and management techniques has been uneven through both time and space as well as discontinuous rather than incremental. This complex pattern of public administration reform has created immense difficulties for theorists seeking to explain the genesis of public sector change and its transformation over time.

Numerous scholars have brought different conceptual perspectives to bear on the problem with varying degrees of success. For instance, over the relatively recent past, we have seen pioneering work by Guy Peters (1996) in his The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models where he developed four distinctive paradigmatic models of reform. An analogous exercise was undertaken by Christopher Hood (1998), who applied modern cultural theory to public sector reform processes in The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. In Market Failure, Government Failure, Leadership and Public Policy, Joe Wallis and Brian Dollery (1999) considered the impact of recent advances in economics on public administration reform. In her Critical Analyses of Organizations: Theory, Practice and Revitalization, Catherine Casey (2002) has invoked the sociology of organizations to focus on the social tendencies and social contestations in modern organizations. A final example of recent attempts to explain public sector reform can be

Public sector reform under the guise of NPM has now been under way for more than two decades across the developed world. During this period it has attracted a voluminous literature aimed at explaining not only the origins of the revolution in public administration, but also its guiding principles. Despite this prolonged scholarly scrutiny, the NPM philosophy and its manifestations in real-world civil service systems remain at best partly understood.

While these and other contributions to the literature on public sector reform have all undoubtedly advanced our understanding of the phenomenon, much remains to be done. In broad terms, the existing corpus of work is perhaps best assessed by invoking the meta-theoretical distinction between policy paradigms and sub-policy paradigms — a theme taken up in this book. In effect, Peters (1996), Hood (1998), Wallis and Dollery (1999), Casey (2002), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), and writers in the modernization tradition have developed and refined particular sub-policy paradigms to explain the origins and evolution of reform processes in public administration systems.

But these efforts are incomplete. At least two ways of augmenting existing knowledge can be identified, both of which are pursued in the present volume. After a broad survey of the patterns of public sector reform evident in western public administration structures, and a review of the policy paradigms that seem to have shaped a differentiated reform processes in different countries, the book explores two generic themes previously not considered in tandem. In the first place, we examine the role that economists have played in these reform processes, not simply through constructing the theoretical models that have shaped and propelled reform initiatives, but also in providing the policy leadership necessary to advance reform policies in a coherent direction. It is argued that a fortuitous confluence of the division of policy-making authority in the traditional PPA-type civil service hierarchy between politicians and technical experts, together with the dominance of conventional welfare economics in the microeconomic sphere and Keynesian macroeconomics, gave economists and public management specialists a unique opportunity to exercise considerable influence over the direction of public policy. The replacement of PPA bureaucracy by NPM-type public organizations as well as the slow demise of the ‘Keynesian consensus’ and the subsequent triumph of the government failure paradigm set the stage for a new role for policy leadership by economists and public management specialists. Instead of the presumed ‘ideological neutrality’ of economics and other technical specialists under PPA-style public administration, in their new role economists and management specialists became explicit ‘change agents’ in NPM-type public agencies with an overt commitment to reconstitute public administration in accordance with the ascendant government failure paradigm and its related economic theories, including new classical macroeconomics, agency theory, public choice and New Institutional Economics.

The second major theme of this book concerns the critical significance of developing leadership potential at all levels of the public sector to both advocate and encourage the adoption of reform policies as well as to take advantage of the opportunities the reforms have wrought to create new forms of public value. The new style of ‘top-down’ policy leadership required by NPM-type reform programs, and the consolidation of the gains derived from these programs, focused on reducing resistance to policy change. In particular, the consolidation phase of reform leadership has undergone a marked transformation as it has evolved towards a more supportive style of leader. The need for supportive policy leadership has generated a demand for developing leadership at all levels of government to broaden, deepen and defend the process of change. The quality of leadership in public administration has therefore emerged as an important factor in its own right in advancing reform strategies. The degree to which policy economics sufficiently appreciate the importance of this kind of leadership represents a central concern of this book.

The coalescence of these two themes together seeks to break new ground by demonstrating that the constellation of economic theories, comprising agency theory, public choice theory and the New Institutional Economics, that have been employed to design the public sector reform processes, can also be adopted to explain why there has been public sector leadership that has reflected a particular style of ‘managerialism.’ This approach can shed light on the surprising phenomenon that the leadership style that has typically evolved has been ‘appreciative’ rather the expected ‘hard-edged’ contractualism often associated with this approach to public management.
reform. The explication of this thesis is necessarily multi-disciplinary in approach. This means we have had to draw on various strands of the literature on public administration developed in several allied social disciplines.

3Excerpt taken from Reform and Leadership in the Public Sector, 1 - 3.
Self-analysis is always difficult. The military, although not alone, is especially known for its conservatism, insularity and reluctance at self-security. In the late 1950s, author and journalist Pierre Berton wrote *The Comfortable Pew*, a critical examination of the Christian Church's complacency and self-satisfaction. In many ways, the Canadian Forces (CF) were in a similar position of self-satisfaction in the late 1980s. To be sure, there was grumbling about defence budgets that were too small, equipment that was getting old and, in comparison with the 'golden' years of the 1950s (when regular force strength, navy, army, and air force tipped 120,000, all ranks), establishments that left something to be desired. Yet these years were still something of a 'comfortable' (or at least familiar) pew for the armed forces. You knew where you stood. Although there were signs of strain in the Warsaw Pact, the Cold War continued, and that gave the navy, army, and air force their main *raisons d'êtres.* 4 Brigade remained the army's jewel in the crown, and so long as there were Allied politicians like Helmut Schmidt around, eventually the need to maintain Canada's reputation in NATO would result in at least some new equipment. The NATO commitment sustained the navy too, and combined with NORAD, was the air force's main focus as well. Within the cyclical process of capital procurement and defence spending, at some point in every decade one of the elements was the winner — *Leopard* tanks were followed by CF18 fighter aircraft, and they were followed by patrol frigates. The CF could not claim to be up to date in every respect, but they could still be valued members of the team. And as members of the team, Canada happily left strategic and operational thought to others with more clout. We really didn't have to think for ourselves.

Peacekeeping was also a routine, especially for the army. Units rotated in and out of Cyprus and the Middle-East, taking their turn on various 'green lines' in what were generally
predictable deployments. There were surprises from time to time, but nothing earth-shatteringly new, and for
the most part the CF took pride (without thinking about it too much) in their reputation as the armed forces
with the greatest peacekeeping experience and expertise in the world.

Then came the changes and the shocks. The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of Canadian Forces
from Europe demolished old strategic truths: Canada and the Canadian Forces were going to have to think
for themselves about their place in the world. Decidedly non-traditional peacekeeping operations in the Balk-
ans, Rwanda, and worst of all, Somalia produced incidents that equally demolished the old peacekeeping
truths and, at the same time, raised questions about moral standards in the Canadian Forces. Further dra-
matic budget cuts followed, the Department of National Defence (DND) was re-engineered, the regular force
grew smaller, and from the perspective of public opinion it seemed that Canadians had lost faith in their
armed forces.

That had never happened before. The country may well have taken the armed forces for granted most of the
time — and not very seriously most of the rest of the time, at least in peacetime — but never before had there
been any indication of such a loss of faith. Initially, the reaction within the Department of National Defence
and the Canadian Forces was to circle the wagon, but there were those who understood that the status quo
had to change; that like the US Armed Forces after Vietnam, this was a time for professional renewal that
went beyond mere organizational change. These individuals saw that there were real lessons to be learned
from Somalia, the Balkans, and the Gulf War, and they realized that the way ahead required a fundamental
rededication, if not reform, to their profession and to professionalism. They understood that this process re-
quired both looking back and looking forward, and that for thorough-going change to occur the general officer
corps of the next few years had to be in the forefront of that transformation. For it was the generals who had
the moral authority to translate written and spoken prescriptions (or hopes) into reality.

Warrior Chiefs: Perspective on Canadian Military Leaders (Dundurn Press, 2001), and its companion volume,
Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership together form
part of the process of rededication and reform to the longstanding values of the Canadian military profession
by examining the experience of Canadian admirals and generals in war and in peace, with all their commonal-
ities and differences — to help us understand where we have come from and what the Canadian military pro-
fession has been — and by looking at the present and future, to help us better understand where we may be
going and how we might arrive there.

In Warrior Chiefs, our intent was to commission articles on leaders from the past to discover the good (and
sometimes not so good) elements of their experience, and to examine the different style of leadership to de-
terminate their success and suitability in a given context. In Generalship and the Art of the Admiral our per-
spective is somewhat different. This book is divided into five thematic parts. Initially, we look into the past to
provide an historic overview of Canadian officership and generalship, but in a very general way. Next, we in-
vestigate the nature of higher command. Terms such as leadership, command and generalship are often
tossed about with a misplaced, if not misguided, confidence in common understanding of the words them-

The third section of the book explores actual operations and the lessons that can be derived therefrom. Es-
says by serving and former serving officers range from NORAD and NATO in the Cold War, to Rwanda and
the Balkans in the tumultuous Cold War period.

Next, the book boldly examines civil-military relations in the context of senior military lead-
ership, an area that has not been well understood in the past. Finally, this volume ends

www.csl.uoguelph.ca
with a look at the functional roles and responsibilities of the Canadian Forces generals and flag officers.

At one level we hope that these contributions will stimulate thought and debate about the future of the military profession in this country — not necessarily the specifics of defence policy but rather about what Canadian generalship actually means. It should not be construed as just another promotion with a higher pay scale, but rather entry into the senior leadership cadre of the nation with all the obligations and responsibilities that entails.

The attempt to spark this discourse, in full recognition of the divergence in opinion on many of the subjects broached in this book, is consciously made. We hope that it will be clear that unfettered discussion on these subjects cannot only be tolerated, but should be encouraged. Readers must understand that, without transparency on such issues — a readiness for unselfconscious self-examination — there is no foundation for critical debate, thus no opportunity for improvement and progression as an institution or officer corps. It is this critical debate that will take the armed forces successfully down the unpredictable roads that lie ahead. As Lieutenant-General (retired) R.A. Dallaire so succinctly stated, “never again in ignorance.”

4Excerpt taken from Generalship and the Art of the Admiral, xi-xiii.